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You’ve Got (Political) Questions?
We’ve Got No Answers
by Michael R. Dimino*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rucho v. Common Cause,1 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that partisan-gerrymandering claims present non-justiciable
political questions.2 The decision seemingly settled a controversy that
had existed for decades, during which the Court was simultaneously
unwilling to declare partisan-gerrymandering claims non-justiciable
and unable to agree on a judicially manageable standard for
adjudicating those claims.3 In Rucho, for the first time, a five-Justice
majority definitively concluded that there are no judicially manageable
standards to determine the constitutionality of partisan gerrymanders,
and therefore held that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear cases
raising such claims.4
Although
the
Court
correctly
determined
that
the
partisan-gerrymandering claims should be dismissed, the Court should
not have based its decision on the political-question doctrine. Rather,
the Court should have held simply that the Constitution does not
contain a right against excessive partisanship in districting. Rucho

*Professor of Law, Widener University Commonwealth Law School. State University of
New York at Buffalo (summa cum laude); Harvard Law School (J.D., 2001, cum laude).
Member, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, (1999–2001); Articles Editor (2000–
2001). Member, State Bars of New York and Pennsylvania.
1. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
2. Id. at 2506–07.
3. See
Vieth
v.
Jubelirer,
541
U.S.
267
(2004)
(dismissing
a
partisan-gerrymandering case for want of a judicially manageable standard, but dividing
4–1–4, with a plurality viewing such claims as inherently non-justiciable, and Justice
Kennedy writing a concurrence concluding only that no judicially manageable standard
had yet developed); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (holding that partisangerrymandering claims are justiciable, but dividing on the standard for deciding when
partisan-gerrymanders are unconstitutional).
4. 139 S. Ct. at 2508.
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should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief
could be granted, rather than for lack of jurisdiction. 5 Resting the
decision on the political-question doctrine has led some to suggest that
state courts (which are not bound by the Article III case-or-controversy
limitations on federal-court jurisdiction) can reach the merits of
partisan-gerrymandering claims and hold districting schemes that give
too much of an advantage to one party unconstitutional. 6
My thesis, however, is not simply that the Court should have issued
a broader holding than it did. Rather, my thesis is that the Court issued
a broader holding than it acknowledged—that what appeared to be a
political-question holding was in reality a holding on the merits. Stated
differently, the Court’s application of the political-question doctrine
made it indistinguishable from an analysis of the merits.
Rucho did not hold (in fact, the Court could not have held) that all
possible standards for deciding partisan-gerrymandering claims would
be unmanageable by the judiciary. In fact, the Court itself suggested
that standards contained in state constitutions were judicially
manageable.7 Rather, the Court’s holding was that the Federal
Constitution contained no judicially manageable standards for
adjudicating partisan-gerrymandering claims, and as a result there was
no jurisdiction.8
II. POLITICAL QUESTIONS, REAL AND APPARENT
The federal courts lack authority to decide “[q]uestions, in their
nature political”9—questions, that is, that should be decided by the
“political branches” and not the courts.10 Where the political-question
doctrine is applicable, it operates as a jurisdictional bar, preventing

5. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (providing for dismissal for “lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction”) with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (providing for dismissal for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”).
6. Compare Michael Solimine, State Courts as Forums for Partisan Gerrymandering
Claims after Common Cause v. Rucho (Rucho Symposium), ELECTION LAW BLOG,
https://electionlawblog.org/?p=105902 (last visited Oct. 31, 2019) (arguing that state
courts may hear such claims after Rucho), with Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the
Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908 (2015), and John Harrison, The
Political Question Doctrines, 67 AM. U.L. REV. 457 (2017) (pre-Rucho articles arguing that
state courts may not be used to evade the political-question doctrine).
7. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507–08.
8. Id. at 2508.
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
10. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277).
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federal courts from intervening even when the government fails to meet
its constitutional obligations.11
Political questions, properly limited, are those cases “in which the
challenged government action is subject to legal constraint, but, the
constraint, for some reason, is not judicially enforceable.” 12 Baker v.
Carr famously catalogued the kinds of questions that would be
considered political:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.13

Rucho involved the second of these types of political questions: those
issues for the resolution of which there is no “judicially discoverable and
manageable standard[][.]”14
When the Constitution contains a standard but the standard is not
judicially enforceable, the political-question doctrine should apply and
the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.15 Where, however,
there is no standard in the Constitution for anyone to apply, the Court
should dismiss on the merits rather than relying on the
political-question doctrine.16 Those cases are not true political-question
cases at all. Rather, they are decisions on the merits that the
Constitution does not entitle the challenger to relief.
As Baker indicated, political questions include more than simply
those issues lacking judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving them; rather, they include a range of issues that should be
resolved by the political branches instead of the judiciary. For example,
a political question—a question for the political branches—would be
presented if the Constitution or other governing law committed the
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
JONATHAN R. SIEGEL, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 217 (2d ed. 2019).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 277–78 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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resolution of that question to another branch. 17 For example, in Morgan
v. United States,18 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit refused to hear a case challenging the House of
Representatives’ decision as to which candidate had won a disputed
election.19 The court pointed to Article I, § 5, clause 1 of the
Constitution,20 which provides that “[e]ach House shall be the Judge of
the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members.” 21 The
standard was readily ascertainable—the candidate with the higher vote
total should have been seated—but the matter was not one for the
judiciary to resolve.22 Thus, the case presented a political question. 23
Similarly, in Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,24
the Court refused to decide whether Oregon’s constitutional provision
authorizing the initiative and referendum violated the portion of the
federal Constitution requiring Congress to “guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government[.]”25 The Court concluded
that the Constitution gave Congress, not the courts, the responsibility
to guarantee republican government in the states, and therefore the
Supreme Court did not decide for itself whether Oregon’s government
was “republican” within the meaning of the Constitution.26
As others have pointed out, however, the Supreme Court sometimes
invokes the political-question doctrine in another, very different, way.
In this second use of the political-question doctrine (which Professor
Jonathan Siegal has called a “bogus” use of the doctrine),27 the Court
dismisses a case only after determining that the plaintiff should lose on
the merits.28 Thus, a plaintiff who files suit alleging that the
government acted unconstitutionally might find his or her case
dismissed under the political-question doctrine if the court concludes
that the government actually had the ability to take the challenged
17. Grove, supra note 6, at 1909.
18. 801 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
19. Id. at 446–47.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
21. Morgan, 801 F.2d at 447 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1).
22. Id. at 450.
23. Id.
24. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
25. Id. at 136–37, 151 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4).
26. Id. at 150–51.
27. See SIEGEL, supra note 12, at 217; Jonathan R. Siegel, Political Questions and
Political Remedies, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 243 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007). See also
Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
28. See Nixon v. United Staets, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
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action—in other words, the Constitution entrusted the government with
the authority to decide whether to act in the challenged way. 29
Nixon v. United States provides an example.30 There, the Supreme
Court held that it would not decide whether the procedures used in an
impeachment proceeding satisfied the Senate’s obligation to “try”
impeachments.31 Part of the Court’s analysis rested on the conclusion
that the meaning of the word “try” was committed to the Senate, and
that the courts had no authority to opine on the question. 32 Elsewhere,
however, the Court justified its dismissal of the case by saying that the
word “try” was broad enough to include the procedure that had been
alleged to be unconstitutional.33 That is, the Court determined that the
Constitution had not been violated, and it used that determination to
justify its decision to dismiss the case and (paradoxically) to avoid
deciding whether the Constitution had been violated.34
Although the Supreme Court has never acknowledged the difference
between these two kinds of political questions, there should be a
distinction between cases for which there can be no judicially
manageable standard and those for which there is no judicially
discoverable standard in the law being interpreted. Only the first group
should be considered political questions because they represent the core
separation-of-powers concern of the political-question doctrine: ensuring
that the matter is decided by a branch other than the judiciary.
Indeed, this interpretation permits Baker’s second category to be a
natural companion to the first and third (albeit with some overlap).
There is a political question either when the Constitution’s text
commits the matter to another branch (as in Morgan);35 or when the
text is ambiguous about the branch that should decide a question, but
the standards for resolving the matter are not the kind that could be
applied by courts;36 or when the resolution of the matter turned on
policy determinations “of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”37

29. See id. at 237–38.
30. See id. at 224.
31. Id. at 238; See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
32. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229–34.
33. See id. at 229–30.
34. Id. at 237–38.
35. 801 F.2d at 446–47.
36. Question in this category might include whether “the public Safety . . . require[s]”
a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, or whether an
impost is “absolutely necessary for executing [a state’s] inspection Laws,” id. art. I, § 10,
cl. 2.
37. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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Cases in which the Constitution contains no judicially discoverable
limit on the government’s discretion, however, are different. Those
cases should be decided on the merits—and dismissed because the
Constitution does not render the government’s action illegal. Indeed, if
a court examines the constitutional provision in question and discovers
no limit on government action, then the court is already examining the
merits of the case. Nothing is gained by characterizing the dismissal as
jurisdictional.38
In Rucho, the Court could not find a standard in the Constitution for
assessing when partisanship had been too much of a factor in
districting.39 What the Court was really saying was that there was no
point at which there is an unconstitutionally large amount of
partisanship. Therefore, the Constitution contains no right against
partisan-gerrymandering and the Court should have said as much.
III. RUCHO V. COMMON CAUSE
Rucho v. Common Cause involved a constitutional challenge to two
partisan-gerrymanders.40 Rucho itself involved a congressional
redistricting that split North Carolina’s thirteen districts 10–3 in favor
of Republicans.41 The companion case of Lamone v. Benisek involved a
redistricting that split Maryland’s eight congressional districts 7–1 in
favor of Democrats.42 In each case the partisan motivation was
absolutely clear.43 Voters and interest groups challenged the
gerrymanders, alleging that they violated the Equal Protection
Clause;44 the First Amendment;45 the provision of Article I, § 2 of the
Constitution46 providing for popular election of the House of

38. The Constitution’s terms are often vague, and such provisions as the Due Process
Clauses and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment can hardly be said to
contain a standard for enforcing the limitations they place on government. Thus, if Rucho
imposed a strict jurisdictional requirement that each provision of the Constitution contain
an enforcement standard, there would be a judicial abdication of large areas of
constitutional law. My claim is far more modest. I argue only that if courts determine that
a vague provision of the Constitution allows the government to engage in certain
behavior, they should hold on the merits that the Constitution has not been violated,
rather than holding that the vagueness of the provision deprives them of jurisdiction.
39. 139 S. Ct. at 2500.
40. Id. at 2491.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2493.
43. See id. at 2491, 2493.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
45. Id. amend. I.
46. Id. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
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Representatives; and Article I, § 4, clause 1,47 according to which the
states may provide for the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional
elections.48
The Supreme Court held that the challenges had to be dismissed
because they presented a political question. 49 According to the Court,
political gerrymandering was a political question because of the second
of Baker v. Carr’s six criteria: There was a “lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for” 50 determining when any
particular
partisan-gerrymander
violated
the
Constitution.51
Repeatedly the Court explained that the reason it could not declare the
gerrymanders unconstitutional was the lack of appropriate standards
for distinguishing between constitutional and unconstitutional uses of
partisanship in districting.52
The Court seemingly accepted that, on the merits, excessive
partisanship in districting violated the Constitution. 53 At the same
time, the Court was quite clear that partisanship could be a factor in
districting decisions, at least to some extent.54 The problem was in
drawing the line. The Court thought it was powerless to hear the case
because the Constitution contained no sufficiently definite test for
determining when partisan considerations were unconstitutionally
excessive—when redistricting was tainted by too much partisanship. 55

47. Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
48. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2492–93 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1).
49. Id. at 2506–07.
50. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
51. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07 (“We conclude that partisan gerrymandering
claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”).
52. Id. at 2500, 2502, 2505, 2507.
53. See id. at 2507 (“Our conclusion does not condone excessive partisan
gerrymandering.”). See also id. at 2497 (“The ‘central problem’ . . . is ‘determining when
political gerrymandering has gone too far.’”) (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 296 (plurality
opinion)); id. at 2499 (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)) (requiring “a
standard that can reliably differentiate unconstitutional from ‘constitutional political
gerrymandering,’” thereby implying that some amount of political gerrymandering was
unconstitutional). Accord id. at 2504 (criticizing one proposal as not amounting to “a
serious standard for separating constitutional from unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering”); id. at 2505 (arguing that a proposal was an unsatisfactory “way of
distinguishing permissible from impermissible partisan motivation”).
54. See id. at 2497 (“‘[A] jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political
gerrymandering.’”) (quoting Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 551); id. at 2501 (“[L]egislatures have
the authority to engage in a certain degree of partisan gerrymandering[.]”); id. at 2502 (“A
partisan gerrymandering claim cannot ask for the elimination of partisanship.”).
55. Id. at 2508.
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Crucially, however, the Court did not (and could not) argue that it
would be impossible to develop judicially manageable standards for
drawing that line. Rather, the Court’s holding was that there were no
judicially manageable standards in the Constitution.56 Thus, the key
question was not whether courts were capable of policing excessive
partisanship in districting, but whether the Constitution specified a
rule for distinguishing between excessive and permissible amounts of
partisanship in districting. As the Court explained, “‘[j]udicial action
must be governed by standard, by rule,’ and must be ‘principled,
rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions’ found in the
Constitution or laws.”57
The difference between asking whether, on the one hand, it is
possible to develop a judicially manageable standard and, on the other
hand, asking whether the Constitution contains a judicially manageable
standard is extremely important because one could easily imagine a
judicially
manageable
standard
for
adjudicating
partisan-gerrymandering claims. A constitutional rule simply banning
all consideration of partisan advantage would probably be manageable,
as would a rule that permitted some consideration of partisanship but
outlawed districting plans where partisanship predominated over
“neutral” considerations. In fact, the Court regularly applies the
predominant-factor test in evaluating claims of racial, rather than
partisan, gerrymandering,58 so the test must be judicially manageable.
Other, more mathematically complicated, standards—such as
consideration of the “efficiency gap,” which measures the “wasted votes”
cast for each party (those votes cast for losing candidates or those cast
for winning candidates in excess of the number needed to win the
election)—have also been suggested by litigants, scholars, and lower
courts.59 Despite the apparent complexity of those standards, they
provide objective, numerical measures of partisanship in districting,
and therefore would be capable of objective application in individual
cases by judges looking to apply judicially manageable standards.
Thus, if the jurisdictional question turned on whether a judicially
manageable standard could be applied to partisan-gerrymandering
claims, such claims would be justiciable. Instead, Rucho held that the

56. Id.
57. Id. at 2507 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (plurality opinion)).
58. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916–17 (1995).
59. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering
and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. Rev. 831 (2015); Eric M. McGhee, Measuring
Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral Systems, 39 LEGIS. STUDIES Q. 55
(2014).
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case had to be dismissed because the Constitution itself did not contain
any of those judicially manageable standards. 60 In rejecting all of the
proposed tests for assessing unconstitutional levels of partisan
gerrymandering, the Court stated that “none meets the need for a
limited and precise standard that is judicially discernible and
manageable.”61 For the matter to be justiciable, in other words, the
standard must not only be manageable, it must be discernible in the
law. Because the challengers could provide no substantial argument
that the Constitution itself contained a limit on the amount of allowable
partisanship in districting, their suggestion that the Court adopt newly
developed standards missed the point.
The Constitution must permit partisan-gerrymandering, reasoned
the Court, because it had always done so. 62 The Court discussed
historical examples dating from the very first congressional elections, 63
demonstrating that while gerrymandering has always been
controversial and much criticized, the Framers thought that the remedy
for gerrymandering was not action in the courts but Congress’s power to
“make or alter” the state-drafted “Times, Places and Manner” of federal
elections.64 As the Court concluded, “[t]o hold that legislators cannot
take partisan interests into account when drawing district lines would
essentially countermand the Framers’ decision to entrust districting to
political entities.”65
Not only did history demonstrate that the Constitution contained no
right against partisan gerrymanders, but the theory of fairness that
underlay the constitutional claims had also been rejected by the
Court.66 As the Court explained, “[p]artisan gerrymandering claims
invariably sound in a desire for proportional representation.” 67 That is,
they allege that the challenged districting scheme results in one party
receiving fewer legislative seats than it “should” have, 68 or that “groups

60. 139 S. Ct. at 2508.
61. Id. at 2502.
62. See id. at 2505.
63. Id. at 2494–95.
64. Id. at 2495 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4, cl. 1).
65. Id. at 2497.
66. Id. at 2501.
67. Id. at 2499.
68. Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1663, 1677 (2001) (“The notion of dilution . . . hinges on the assumption that
like-minded voters should have a fair chance to coalesce—that is, that an individual’s
ability to aggregate her vote with others matters in a representative democracy.”).
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with a certain level of political support should [but do not] enjoy a
commensurate level of political power and influence.”69
But the Court has repeatedly rejected the contention that any
group—racial, political, ideological, or otherwise—is constitutionally
entitled to any particular electoral results. 70 As the Court has noted,
electoral results can depend on innumerable factors, including local
issues and the quality of the candidates. 71 The only way to guarantee
that parties will receive a “fair” amount of seats compared to their
statewide share of the popular vote is to adopt a system where voters
select parties rather than particular candidates. While there is much to
commend such a system as a matter of political theory, it is not
plausible to believe that the Constitution mandates it. 72
Again and again, Rucho returned to its conclusion that the
Constitution contained no judicially manageable standard because the
Constitution permits at least some political gerrymandering. 73 The
“basic reason” that the Court could not take the predominant-factor test
from the racial-gerrymandering cases and apply it in the
partisan-gerrymandering context had nothing to do with the
manageability of the standard.74 Rather, the difference was the
substance of the Constitution: “while it is illegal for a jurisdiction to
depart from the one-person, one-vote rule, or to engage in racial
discrimination in districting, ‘a jurisdiction may engage in
constitutional political gerrymandering.’”75 “A permissible intent—

69. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499.
70. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75–76 & n.22 (1980); White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–66 (1973) (“To sustain such claims [of vote dilution under the
Constitution], it is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has
not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential.”).
71. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971). See also Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at
2503.
Voters elect individual candidates in individual districts, and their selections
depend on the issues that matter to them, the quality of the candidates, the
tone of the candidates’ campaigns, the performance of an incumbent, national
events or local issues that drive voter turnout, and other considerations. Many
voters split their tickets. Others never register with a political party, and vote
for candidates from both major parties at different points during their
lifetimes. Id.
72. Cf. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 909 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that judging minority vote dilution on the basis of minority voters’
ability to form majorities in single-member districts “is merely a political choice”).
73. 139 S. Ct. at 2501.
74. Id. at 2497.
75. Id. at 2497 (quoting Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 551). See also id. at 2499 (quoting
Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 551) (noting the existence of “‘constitutional political
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securing partisan advantage—does not become constitutionally
impermissible, like racial discrimination, when that permissible intent
‘predominates.’”76
That was the key. Partisan-gerrymandering was “permissible.” The
Constitution—on the merits—allowed line-drawers to act in furtherance
of a partisan motivation. And that “permissible intent” continued to be
permissible even when it was the predominant consideration in
drawing district lines.77 The reason the Constitution lacked a judicially
manageable standard for striking down partisan-gerrymanders—the
basis of the Court’s supposedly jurisdictional holding—was that it was
“permissible” to draw district lines with the predominant purpose of
partisanship.78 That is no different from deciding on the merits that the
Constitution
does
not
render
partisan
gerrymandering
unconstitutional.
The Court similarly distinguished other areas in which the Court has
been tasked with developing its own standards to enforce generally
worded provisions in the Constitution or statutes: “[T]hose instances
typically involve constitutional or statutory provisions or common law
confining and guiding the exercise of judicial discretion. . . . Here, on
the other hand, the Constitution provides no basis whatever to guide
the exercise of judicial discretion.” 79 As the Court summarized, “the
Constitution supplies no objective measure for assessing whether a
districting map treats a political party fairly.”80 Notice: the Court did
not say, “there is [or can be] no objective measure”; rather, the question
for the Court was whether an objective measure was supplied by the
Constitution.81
Reinforcing the point, the Court looked to specific constitutional
provisions that might limit the use of partisanship in districting to see
if they contained judicially manageable standards. 82 By separately

gerrymandering’”); id. (stating that the plaintiffs were “[u]nable to claim that the
Constitution requires proportional representation . . . [of political parties]”); id. at 2501
(“[L]egislatures have the authority to engage in a certain degree of partisan
gerrymandering[.]”); id. at 2502 (“A partisan gerrymandering claim cannot ask for the
elimination of partisanship.”); Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “politics as usual” is a “‘traditional’ redistricting criterion”).
76. Id. at 2503.
77. Id. at 2502–03.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2505–06. As stated, see note 38, supra, the Court overstates the degree to
which the Constitution contains enforcement standards.
80. Id. at 2501.
81. See id. at 2494, 2501.
82. Id. at 2502, 2504, 2506.
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evaluating the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, Article I
§ 2, and the Guarantee Clause, the Court demonstrated that the
availability vel non of judicially manageable standards is to be
determined by reference to the law being interpreted. 83 If it was
sufficient for the Court (or the parties, or amici or scholars) to develop
theretofore unimagined judicially manageable standards, it would have
been unnecessary to consider whether those standards appeared in any
particular provision of the Constitution. A judicially manageable
standard would either have existed or not; its existence would not have
depended on which constitutional provision was invoked. Instead, the
Court insisted that the standard be in a particular constitutional
provision, which therefore required the Court to determine whether
anything in the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, or
Article I provided a standard for saying how much was too much. 84
Rucho noted that some states have specific constitutional provisions
limiting the government’s ability to use partisan gerrymandering, and
suggested that those provisions might provide judicially manageable
standards for determining which gerrymanders were unconstitutional. 85
The Court made special mention of Florida’s “Fair Districts
Amendment,”86 which provides that “[n]o apportionment plan or
individual district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a
political party or an incumbent.”87 Pointing out that “there is no ‘Fair
Districts Amendment’ to the Federal Constitution,” the Court suggested
that the U.S. Constitution lacked the “standards and guidance” that the
Florida provision provided to its state courts. 88
The Court’s discussion of Florida’s specific prohibition on partisan
gerrymandering (along with similar provisions in other states’ laws)
confirms that judicially manageable standards must be found in the
text being interpreted. Florida’s experience showed that a judicially
manageable standard not only was possible, but such a standard was in
fact being managed by the Florida judiciary.89 But the Court properly
dismissed the Florida experience as irrelevant to the question whether

83. Id.
84. Id. at 2508.
85. Id. at 2507–08.
86. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20(a)
87. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507–08 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20(a) and similar
provisions from Iowa and Delaware).
88. Id. at 2507.
89. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2015).
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the United States Constitution contained a judicially manageable
standard to adjudicate partisan-gerrymandering claims.90
Paradoxically, however, the Court’s approach of looking to the
Constitution for a judicially manageable standard required the Court to
interpret the Constitution before deciding that it had no jurisdiction to
decide the case. Ordinarily, jurisdiction must be considered as a
threshold matter.91 If jurisdiction is lacking, “the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
cause.”92 But if the basis of refusing jurisdiction is the Constitution’s
absence of standards, then it is necessary to examine the Constitution
to see what standards are subsumed in the constitutional language. As
Rucho demonstrates, it is not sufficient simply to say that there are
judicially manageable standards for deciding cases under the Equal
Protection Clause; rather, the Court needs to determine what the
standards are for distinguishing successful from unsuccessful
partisan-gerrymandering challenges under that clause. 93 And the
standard for separating successful from unsuccessful claims is little
different from deciding the case on the merits. After all, the court in
Rucho found the case non-justiciable precisely because the Constitution
did not contain a right to proportionality or any other particular
standard of partisan fairness.94 There is no meaningful difference
between that and simply stating that the Constitution does not contain
a right to any degree of partisan fairness.
Rucho never appears to acknowledge that its unwillingness to accept
jurisdiction unless it could first discern a judicially manageable
standard is quite inconsistent with the Court’s approach in Baker.95
90. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508.
91. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 92–102 (1998) (rejecting
the use of “hypothetical jurisdiction”); Cf. Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015)
(holding that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2284, judges should determine whether to appoint a
three-judge district court in cases challenging congressional-district apportionments
before deciding the merits of those challenges).
92. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868).
93. See 139 S. Ct. at 2502.
94. Id.
95. The clearest departure from Baker was Rucho’s dismissal of the lower court’s
argument that the Article I, § 2 was violated because “partisan gerrymanders violate ‘the
core principle of [our] republican government’ preserved in Art. I, § 2, ‘namely, that the
voters should choose their representatives, not the other way around.’” Rucho, 139 S. Ct.
at 2506 (quoting Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 940 (M.D.N.C. 2018)).
The Supreme Court correctly noted that the district court’s rationale “seems like an
objection more properly grounded in the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, § 4 . . . .” Id.
Dismissal was therefore required because the Court had already held that the Guarantee
Clause was non-justiciable. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel., 223 U.S. 118. But Baker had
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There, the Court announced that there were standards for adjudicating
the constitutionality of unequally populated districts because “[j]udicial
standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and
familiar[.]”96 Exactly what standard would be applied, however, was not
announced until two years later, in Reynolds v. Sims,97 when the Court
formulated the one-person, one-vote standard.98
The Rucho Court, however, quite properly abandoned this aspect of
Baker.99 Baker’s refusal to announce the standards it would use to
adjudicate the constitutionality of unequally populated districts
provided reason to doubt its assurance that there were judicially
manageable standards.100 One cannot determine whether there are
judicially manageable standards without determining what those
standards are. It is only upon identifying the standards, after all, that
one can determine whether the judiciary is capable of managing them.
However, Rucho was wrong to rest its conclusion on the
political-question doctrine. Announcing that the Constitution allows
some partisan gerrymandering and contains no judicially manageable
standards for enforcing a ban on excessive partisan gerrymandering is
tantamount to announcing that the Constitution simply does not
contain a right against excessive partisan gerrymandering. The
historical evidence that the Court identified early in its opinion
demonstrates clearly that political considerations have been a common
(if commonly criticized) feature of districting ever since the country was
founded.101 Rather than focus on the lack of standards for
distinguishing permissible from impermissible gerrymanders, the Court
should have allowed the historical evidence to point to its most natural
conclusion: the Constitution simply contains no limit on partisanship in
districting.

found jurisdiction under the Equal Protection Clause to adjudicate a claim that was
exactly the same in substance as the Guarantee Clause claim that had been rejected a few
years earlier in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), as non-justiciable. See Baker, 369
U.S. at 226–27 (“[T]he appellants might conceivably have added a claim under the
Guaranty Clause. Of course, as we have seen, any reliance on that clause would be futile.
But because any reliance on the Guaranty Clause could not have succeeded it does not
follow that appellants may not be heard on the equal protection claim which in fact they
tender.”).
96. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
97. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
98. Id. at 577.
99. 139 S. Ct. at 2495–96.
100. See 377 U.S. at 217.
101. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2493–94.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Unless there are enforceable limits on partisanship in districting,
line-drawers are likely to continue to seek partisan advantage when
drawing district lines. Thus, except in those jurisdictions where state
constitutions place limits on partisan-gerrymandering, Rucho is likely
to lead to districts that produce disproportionate results when
compared to statewide vote totals. This result is unfortunate. I count
myself among those who object to the gerrymandering of districts for
partisan ends. Ideally, in my view, districts would be as competitive as
possible, so as to make representatives responsive to public opinion.
And a very different system that would allocate legislative seats
proportionately by party appeals to an instinctive sense of fairness. 102
But neither responsiveness nor fairness is required by the
Constitution. As Rucho noted, “the fact that such gerrymandering is
‘incompatible with democratic principles’ . . . does not mean that the
solution lies with the federal judiciary.” 103 Neither does it mean that
The Constitution gives judges the responsibility to force the rest of
government to follow its theories of democracy.104

102. See id. at 2506 (“Excessive partisanship in districting leads to results that
reasonably seem unjust.”).
103. Id. (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Independent Redistricting Comm’n,
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)).
104. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 902–03 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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